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Abstract
Housing is an important dimension of social inequality between couples, but it has 
been largely ignored in prior research on union dissolution. Extending the literature 
that controlled for the stabilizing effect of homeownership, we investigate whether 
housing, measured as household density, housing tenure and housing affordability, 
is related to the risk of union dissolution. Based on data from the German Family 
Panel (pairfam), we analyze 3441 coresidential partnerships. We run discrete-time 
event-history models to assess the risk of separation within a time frame of 7 years. 
Housing affordability is found to be negatively related to the risk of union dissolu-
tion among couples, as those couples with a high residual income (i.e., household 
income after deducting housing costs) were less likely to separate than those with 
a lower residual income. By contrast, household density is found to be unrelated 
to separation. In line with previous research, our findings indicate that homeown-
ers had more stable relationships than tenants. The analysis shows that this was the 
case regardless of whether the home was jointly owned or was owned by one partner 
only.
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1 Introduction
Partnership dissolution is a widespread phenomenon in advanced societies. Such break-
ups can have negative consequences for both the partners (Andreß and Bröckel 2007; 
Kalmijn 2010) and their children (Amato and James 2010). Therefore, it is important 
to understand whether the risk of separating is unequally distributed across specific 
socioeconomic groups. The existing empirical evidence has, however, been inconclu-
sive (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010; Killewald 2016; Wagner and Weiß 2003). In this 
paper, we focus on an important dimension of the socioeconomic situations of couples, 
namely their housing conditions. Given the social stratification of housing outcomes 
(Kurz and Blossfeld 2004; Dewilde and De Decker 2016; Zavisca and Gerber 2016) 
and the centrality of housing for couples’ everyday lives, it seems surprising that, apart 
from studies that include homeownership as a control variable in statistical models, 
there has been little research explicitly focusing on the association between housing 
conditions and relationship stability. We investigate to what extent housing tenure (with 
joint and sole homeownership as distinct categories), housing affordability and house-
hold density are associated with the risk of union dissolution.
Housing characteristics are closely related to the overall socioeconomic situations of 
couples, as wealth is positively associated with homeownership, home size and hous-
ing affordability. We argue, however, that housing has an independent net influence on 
the risk of union dissolution because our three indicators are determined not only by 
couples’ income levels, but by the housing market conditions in their local areas. If 
house prices increase, a smaller share of the local population will have access to home-
ownership, unless earnings levels and/or interest rates also adapt. Similarly, household 
density and affordability depend on the availability of spacious and affordably priced 
housing. From this perspective, analyzing the impact of housing characteristics on the 
risk of union dissolution is important because, in contrast to other dimensions of the 
socioeconomic status of a couple, housing is affected by specific external conditions, 
including the available housing stock, house prices, the state of the rental market and 
access to mortgages. This is of special interest in the context of changing housing mar-
kets—and although the German housing market has been comparably stable for years, 
house prices rose rapidly in the past decade (Wijburg and Aalbers 2017).
In the following chapter, we discuss prior research findings. Section 3 is devoted to 
our theoretical considerations. Our empirical analyses focus on the association between 
the risk of union dissolution on the one hand; and housing affordability, household den-
sity, as well as a refined measure of housing tenure on the other. We use data from 
the German Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics (pairfam) 
for the years 2008 to 2015 (see Sect. 4). The results of our discrete-time event-history 
models are presented in Sect. 5. The last section concludes.
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2  Previous Research
A large number of previous studies have examined the determinants of union dis-
solution, including couples’ employment situations, income levels, education and 
demographic situations (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010; Amato 2010; Härkönen 
2014). Many of these studies controlled for housing tenure in their statistical analy-
sis of union dissolution patterns. Although a few authors found no statistically sig-
nificant association between homeownership and the likelihood of union dissolution 
in specific sub-groups (Yabiku et al. 2009; Cooke 2006 for the western German sub-
sample; Killewald 2016 for the marriage cohorts of 1968–1974 in the USA; Coulter 
and Thomas 2019 found significantly increased separation risks only among social 
renters compared to homeowners, but not among private renters in the UK), a major-
ity found that homeowners have more stable relationships than tenants (Grinstein-
Weiss et al. 2014; Wagner and Weiß 2003; Bracher et al. 1993; South 2001; Wiik 
et al. 2009; Kaplan and Stier 2017; Jalovaara 2002; Ostermeier and Blossfeld 1998; 
Kaplan and Herbst 2015; Raz-Yurovich 2012). However, the associations between 
union dissolution and other factors related to housing, such as household density and 
affordability, have been studied less often (but see Coulter and Thomas 2019 for an 
exception).
The existing evidence on crowding in the household and union dissolution is 
mixed. A study for Russia found that the number of rooms in a dwelling was nega-
tively related to the probability of divorce (Gerber and Zavisca 2015). Also, Coul-
ter and Thomas (2019) found evidence that space pressure was positively related to 
separation in the UK. In Finland, Jalovaara (2002) found that living in overcrowded 
housing conditions was associated with elevated divorce risks, but that this result 
was not robust after controlling for other socioeconomic factors. Moreover, a recent 
study in Luxembourg showed that the association between crowding and union 
dissolution disappeared after controlling for homeownership (van Damme 2019). 
O’Connor et al. (1999) found a bivariate relationship between crowding and separa-
tion in England, but also that this relationship vanished after further covariates were 
taken into account.
With a focus on Sweden, one study has examined housing affordability and its 
association with the risk of divorce at the micro-level (Lauster 2008). The results 
showed that the ability to cover housing payments was positively related to partner-
ship stability, but only among renter households. Among homeowners, no associa-
tion was found between housing cost burden and partnership stability. Additionally, 
a recent study of the UK found that mortgage or rent arrears were associated with an 
increased union dissolution risk (Coulter and Thomas 2019).
A number of other studies that focused on the link between socioeconomic status 
and partnership quality in general found that economic hardship is negatively related 
to partnership quality (Hardie et al. 2014; Conger et al. 1990, 2010). However, the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between financial resources and partnership 
stability is less clear: some studies that examined this issue found no statistically 
significant association between household income and the risk of union dissolu-
tion (Killewald 2016; Schoen et al. 2002; Cooke 2006), whereas others found that 
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couples with lower incomes have higher dissolution risks (Brines and Joyner 1999; 
Dechter 1992; Kalmijn et  al. 2007; Kaplan and Herbst 2015; Raz-Yurovich 2012; 
Jalovaara 2013). Many of these studies distinguished between the effects of hus-
bands’ and wives’ socioeconomic resources. While husbands’ resources were shown 
to be associated with higher levels of union stability (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010), 
the findings for wives’ earnings and labor force participation were rather mixed (see 
Härkönen 2014; Özcan and Breen 2012 for recent reviews). In summary, most pre-
vious studies find a stabilizing effect of homeownership on partnerships. The few 
analyses on the effect of housing affordability indicate that housing costs are posi-
tively associated with union dissolution, while there is no clear pattern for the effect 
of household density.
3  Theoretical Background: Housing and Union Dissolution
In analyses that seek to explain the dissolution of unions at the micro-level, ideas 
from exchange theory (Rusbult 1980; Lewis and Spanier 1979; Levinger 1979) and 
the New Household Economics (e.g., Becker et al. 1977) are usually employed. Both 
strands of this theoretical literature suggest that partnerships end because in the long 
run, their (material and non-material) costs exceed their (material and non-material) 
benefits for at least one partner. It therefore appears likely that the anticipated costs 
of separation affect the decision to dissolve or to remain in a union.
One potential barrier to separation is homeownership. The purchase of a home 
is generally seen as an investment in a relationship. Homeownership is, moreover, 
closely related to a household’s economic resources. As buying a house is usually 
the largest investment a household makes, the home is often the most important 
component of a family’s wealth. After a breakup, the value of the investment in joint 
property depreciates for at least one partner, either because only one partner can stay 
in the house, or because selling the house produces transaction costs. Thus, unions 
of homeowners tend to be more stable than those of tenants.
Additionally, it has been argued that the homeownership effect might be a result 
of a selection process, whereby the partners anticipate the negative consequences of 
separation for their housing situation and therefore invest in ownership only if they 
expect to remain together (Lersch and Vidal 2014). In line with this selection argu-
ment, we assume that couples who are happier in their relationship are more willing 
to increase their level of commitment by purchasing a house together. At the same 
time, such couples are also less likely to break up (Brüderl and Kalter 2001).
Apart from increased relationship commitment, homeownership is related to 
higher housing quality. The housing conditions of homeowners tend to be better than 
those of tenants (Mulder and Smits 1999). On average in Germany, owner-occupied 
houses and apartments are larger, have more rooms and are newer than rented dwell-
ings (DESTATIS 2013). Assuming the household has sufficient resources to cover 
the costs of homeownership, couples who own a home tend to have more opportuni-
ties than tenants for personal fulfillment, as they can create a comfortable home that 
corresponds to their individual preferences. This freedom might be associated with 
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higher levels of overall satisfaction, which may in turn be linked to increased rela-
tionship quality and relationship stability.
Based on these considerations, we expect to find that couples who live in a home 
they own have lower union dissolution risks than those who are tenants (H1a). It 
has long been argued that homeownership represents a partnership-specific invest-
ment by a couple. However, recent studies have pointed out that some couples live 
in a house that is owned by only one of the partners (Lersch and Vidal 2016) or by 
a third person, such as one of the partner’s parents or other kin (Gerber and Zavisca 
2015); and that the dissolution of such partnerships would not involve the depre-
ciation of a joint investment. We therefore expect to find that couples who live in a 
home that is owned by only one of the partners or by a third party (e.g., one part-
ner’s parents) have higher separation risks than joint homeowners (H1b).
In the case of sole homeownership, the effect of homeownership on union stabil-
ity may vary according to the gender of the homeowner. If the female partner is a 
sole homeowner, this might be a sign of her economic independence, one factor that 
enables women to leave an unhappy relationship (Sayer et al. 2011). By contrast, a 
male partner’s ownership might stabilize the partnership because it is in line with 
the gender norm that men should provide for the family. A recent study from the UK 
provides some support for this gendered resources argument as it relates to hous-
ing (Coulter and Thomas 2019). The authors investigated the association between 
who is written into the dwelling contract (rental or ownership) and separation risks. 
Their analyses showed that separation was more likely when only the woman was a 
contract holder, as compared to when both partners or only the man held contractual 
rights. Similarly, we expect that if the woman is the sole homeowner, a couple has 
a higher separation risk compared to joint homeowners (H1c). For male sole home-
owners, we do not expect such a difference.
Another housing-related factor that may affect union stability is household den-
sity. Partners who live in overcrowded housing might have increased stress levels 
and be dissatisfied with their lifestyle. This dissatisfaction may in turn be associated 
with reduced partnership quality (Lewis and Spanier 1979) and an increased risk of 
union dissolution. Household crowding refers to a lack of space in the home of an 
individual or a family and is typically defined as a situation in which there is more 
than one person per room in the home (Gove and Hughes 1983). To ensure that the 
people living in a household have the opportunity to withdraw from social interac-
tions, the home must have a sufficient number of rooms to allow each individual 
member to spend some time alone. In the social psychology literature, it has been 
shown that individuals experience psychological distress in crowded living con-
ditions (Evans 2003; Wells and Harris 2007). If one partner is exposed to stress, 
the other partner can support him or her in dealing with the challenging situation 
(Bodenmann and Cina 2006). If, however, household density is high, both partners 
are subject to the stress-creating situation and might have reduced coping capaci-
ties. Although dyadic coping is largely mediated through communication, a high 
level of density seems to reduce the ability of individuals to interact socially. It has, 
for example, been shown that crowding can lead to withdrawal (Evans and Lepore 
1993), depression, or aggression (Regoeczi 2008). As these behaviors or emotional 
states are negatively associated with partnership quality (Roberts 2000), it is likely 
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that they also negatively affect partnership stability. Based on these considerations, 
we expect to find that couples who live in a household with a high density level face 
a higher risk of union dissolution than couples who live in a household with a low 
density level (H2a).
Rather than separating, a couple may seek to escape a crowded housing situation 
by moving to a more spacious dwelling. Residential mobility is a means of adjusting 
the family’s housing situation to the needs of the members (Rossi 1955; Wagner and 
Mulder 2015). For example, families may move before or after the birth of a child 
because they need (or anticipate the need for) more space (Kulu 2008). Couples who 
can afford to move to a larger apartment will generally choose to avoid crowded liv-
ing conditions. However, couples of low socioeconomic status might have limited 
financial means to move to a larger home because rents and/or search costs are high. 
For these couples, high-density living may be a financial necessity. Thus, they may 
be exposed to suboptimal conditions for a longer time than are couples who can 
afford to move to a more spacious dwelling. We hypothesize that living in a house-
hold with a high level of density is especially detrimental to partnership stability if a 
couple has a high housing cost burden (H2b).
Our third hypothesis focuses on the cost of housing. Housing affordability refers 
to the share of the available income of a household that is used to cover housing 
costs. These costs include all of the expenditures related to housing consumption, 
such as rent, loan repayments and utilities. For many individuals and families, hous-
ing costs take up a large share of their household budget and represent their single 
largest monthly expenditure (OECD 2011; Boehm and Schlottmann 2008). The pos-
sible associations of housing costs and union dissolution are complex and lead us to 
two contradictory arguments. On the one hand, high housing costs can lead to psy-
chological distress of each partner and thus increase the risk of union dissolution. 
Financial worries might create individual stress, which can in turn lead to reduced 
coping abilities and negative interaction patterns between partners. Existing studies 
have found that individuals suffer more from housing cost burdens than from finan-
cial strain in general (Taylor et al. 2007). One potential explanation for this finding 
is that because housing is a basic need, housing costs usually cannot be reduced 
by simply adjusting consumption levels. This is particularly likely to be the case in 
tight housing markets. In such a situation, a high housing cost burden might limit a 
couple’s ability to pay for other essential needs. Based on the assumption that stress 
leads to lower relationship quality and decreased union stability, we expect to find 
that couples who have only a little money left over after housing costs are deducted, 
i.e., who face a higher housing cost burden, are more likely to break up (H3a).
On the other hand, taking an exchange theoretical perspective, the association 
between (regional level) housing affordability and union dissolution might be pos-
itive. Lewis and Spanier (1979) suggest that a low evaluation of alternatives pre-
vents an individual from separation. Translated to the housing situation, a person 
who wants to split up with his coresidential partner might have difficulties finding 
affordable housing and therefore may choose not to separate. Unfortunately, our data 
do not include explicit information about the availability of affordable and suitable 
housing for individuals following a separation. However, the data do include set-
tlement size. Because house prices are generally higher in urban than in rural areas 
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of Germany (Roos 2006), we assume that it is generally easier to find an affordable 
dwelling after separation in smaller communities compared to big cities. Following 
from this idea, we expect that the effect of housing affordability on union dissolu-
tion depends on the area, such that a person who lives in an urban area (especially 
one with a higher housing cost burden) has greater difficulties in finding affordable 
housing after separation than someone living in a rural area. Therefore, we expect 
that among couples with a high housing cost burden, those living in urban areas will 
have a lower risk of union dissolution than those living in rural areas (H3b).
4  Data and Methods
Our analyses are based on a longitudinal dataset, the German Family Panel pair-
fam (Brüderl et al. 2017; Huinink et al. 2011) covering the period between 2008/09 
(Wave 1) and 2014/15 (Wave 7). The dataset includes the partnership histories of 
three birth cohorts (born in 1991–1993, 1981–1983 and 1971–1973). Given our 
focus on coresidential unions, we have analyzed couples in which the partners were 
at least 18 years old and were living together in a household. In order to be able to 
analyze the potentially gendered nature of sole homeownership (hypothesis H1c), 
we dropped same-sex couples from our analyses. The information on each main 
respondent’s housing situation was collected at the time of the interview, not in a 
retrospective manner. Therefore, we reduced the sample to include only those cou-
ples who reported being in a coresidential partnership at the time of the interview.
Unfortunately, as is the case for many other social survey datasets, information on 
housing costs and/or household income is missing for a relatively large share of the 
respondents (32%) in our sample. Ignoring missing values by exclusively analyzing 
complete cases might lead to inefficient and/or biased estimates in multiple regres-
sion analyses (Meinfelder 2014; van Buuren 2012). To deal with this problem, we 
imputed the missing income and housing cost information using Multiple Imputa-
tion by Chained Equations (MICE). We used the predictive mean matching algo-
rithm to multiply impute values for the income and the housing cost variables based 
on longitudinal data from the three nearest neighbors (van Buuren 2012). Using 
Stata 15, we created 20 imputed datasets. The multiple imputation of income and 
housing cost reduced the share of missing observations from 32 to 12%.
To determine the association between housing conditions and separation risks, 
we used a discrete-time hazard model for the transition to union dissolution. The 
data were organized in a discrete-time event-history format, with relationship-years 
as the unit of observation. The process time was the duration of the coresidential 
union. Assuming that the underlying latent time variable was continuous, we speci-
fied a complementary log–log model (Allison 1982). To adjust for multiple observa-
tions of individuals in the period under study, we specified the panel robust standard 
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errors.1 The information on the start of coresidence and on the time of union disso-
lution was based on the dates reported by the respondents. All variables in our anal-
yses are time-varying. Using the information on housing conditions and all other 
variables at the time of the interview, we analyzed the risk of union dissolution in 
the following waves (i.e., all explanatory variables were lagged by 1 year). Using 
the imputed data, we analyzed data from 3441 coresidential couples (16,036 rela-
tionship-years). The separation event was identified by the end date of coresidence 
in a partnership which was available in pairfam’s relationship histories. In addition, 
the data include information about the end date of the relationship. To ensure that 
we were analyzing only those respondents who ended their intimate relationship, 
and did not simply stop living together (e.g., couples who moved into two sepa-
rate households for work-related reasons), we excluded couples who did not dissolve 
their union within 3 months after one partner moved out of the joint household.2 
Most of the relationships in our sample were stable over the study period, but there 
were 401 cases in which the relationship ended (2.5% of the relationship-years or 
11.7% of the couples).
4.1  Measuring Housing Characteristics
Our first housing characteristic is housing tenure. The homeownership rate in Ger-
many in 2013 was 43% (DESTATIS 2013). It should be noted that Germany has 
one of the lowest homeownership rates in Europe (Mulder and Billari 2010). The 
median age at entry into first homeownership strongly depends on the birth cohort 
(Wagner and Mulder 2000), and the average age at entry into homeownership in 
Germany is around the mid-thirties (Angelini et  al. 2013). In most of the studies 
that have been conducted on this topic, the available information on housing tenure 
did not allow the researchers to distinguish between different types of owners. Some 
of these studies focused on comparing joint homeownership with all other housing 
arrangements (Brüderl and Kalter 2001; Rapp et al. 2015), whereas others took into 
account whether the property was inherited (Ostermeier and Blossfeld 1998). Only 
some recent studies analyzed sole homeownership (Lersch and Vidal 2016; Eads 
and Tach 2016; Coulter and Thomas 2019); and, to our knowledge, just one of these 
studies identified non-tenants who were living in a third party’s property (Gerber 
and Zavisca 2015). In our analyses, we distinguish between four groups: (1) couples 
who were joint homeowners, (2) couples in which only one of the partners was a 
homeowner, (3) couples who were tenants and (4) others (e.g., couples who were 
living in a property that belonged to their parents or a third person, but who were 
not tenants). As we can see in Table 1, more than half of the respondents in our sam-
ple were living in a rented dwelling, 26.6% were living in a jointly owned property, 
15.7% were living in a dwelling that was owned by only one of the partners and 
2 Moreover, we excluded those couples who reported a cohabitation break because if the partners did not 
share a dwelling, their housing conditions were less relevant for their partnership development.
1 As the number of multiple cohabitations of the same main respondent was small, we refrained from 
running multilevel analyses.
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5.0% belonged to the other non-tenant group. In order to test the gendered effect of 
sole homeownership (hypothesis H1c), we also distinguished between male (9.6%) 
and female homeowners (6.0%).
Another key variable in this study is household density. In the literature, several 
different objective indicators of density and (over)crowding on the household level 
have been suggested. The term crowding generally refers to an individual’s sub-
jective perception of having a lack of space (Stokols 1972). Because the pairfam 
data do not include information on such subjective measures, we use the number of 
rooms and persons to calculate an objective measure of household density. Building 
on studies in the housing and psychology literature, we define household density 
as the ratio of persons per room (Clark et al. 2000; Gove and Hughes 1983; Con-
ley 2001; Gómez-Jacinto and Hombrados-Mendieta 2002; Regoeczi 2008; Evans 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
of the analytical sample. Means 
and column percent of 
relationship years (complete 
cases). Source: Pairfam waves 
1–7. Authors’ own calculation. 
Means and percentages refer to 
data before multiple imputation
Duration of coresidential union in years Mean: 8.9
Duration of coresidential union in years squared Mean: 111.2
Age of female partner Mean: 33.4















 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 5.0
Household density
 Low (< 1 person/room) 80.4
 Medium (1 person/room) 13.6
 High (> 1 person/room) 6.0
Housing affordability
 Low residual income 31.7
 Medium residual income 34.8
 High residual income 33.6
Number of relationship-years (complete cases) 14,062
Number of separations (complete cases) 371
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2003). In pairfam, the question about the number of rooms was posed as follows: 
And how many rooms does this apartment (or this house) have? If the respondent 
found this question unclear, the interviewer instructed her or him to count only the 
rooms that are larger than six square meters, and that are not bathrooms or kitch-
ens. Thus, in our analysis, the number of rooms refers to the number of bedrooms, 
living rooms and other rooms, such as workrooms. Based on the responses to this 
question, we calculated the ratio of individuals living in the household to the crude 
number of rooms. Clearly, space demands vary across individuals but pairfam data 
do not include details about such differences. However, in line with other studies, we 
assume that children need less space than adults (e.g., Lersch 2014; Rybkowska and 
Schneider 2011). Therefore, in our person–room ratio, we count children under age 
12 as 0.5 of a person, and children aged 12 or older as a full person.3 The smaller the 
value of the indicator, the lower the level of household density (or, in other words, 
the more spacious the dwelling). Conversely, a higher value indicates a higher level 
of density, and thus less space in the dwelling. In the literature, a number of studies 
have dichotomized this variable and defined (over-)crowding as referring to more 
than one person per room. In our study, we decided to use three categories: less than 
one person per room, one person per room and more than one person per room on 
average. This system of categorization allows us to identify whether the threshold 
of less than one person per room is informative for our analyses. Table 1 reveals 
that 6.0% of respondents in our sample were living in a high-density household.4 
Another measure of crowding could differentiate between the statuses of the house-
hold members. For example, it may be seen as less detrimental for the partners’ rela-
tionship if they are sharing a crowded household with their own children, rather than 
with other people. However, since in our sample less than 3% of couples reported 
sharing a household with other people, this category appears to be less relevant in 
the German setting.
Our third housing characteristic is housing affordability on the household level. 
In analyzing this variable, we followed the residual income approach (Stone 2006; 
Haffner and Heylen 2011), in which the amount of income left over after housing 
costs are deducted is divided by the number of household members. Many of the 
previous studies that looked at the impact of affordability used the share of housing 
costs in the monthly household income in their analyses. In Germany, the housing 
cost overburden rate is 23.6%; i.e., in nearly one-quarter of German households, the 
total housing costs exceed 40% of the household income (Rybkowska and Schneider 
2011). However, focusing on the share of income spent on housing might be mis-
leading, as rich households can afford to spend a larger percentage of their income 
on housing than poor households (Stone 2006). Because we are interested in the 
level of the stress couples feel as a result of high housing costs, we use the residual 
4 When we checked how high-density living was distributed among higher- and lower-income house-
holds, we found that high density was more common in households with below median income (9.2%) 
and less common in households with median income or higher (2.8%).
3 We calculated an alternative measure of the person–room ratio in which we counted all household 
members as one person (instead of 0.5 of a person for each child under age 12). The use of this measure 
led to substantially the same results in our regression analyses (not shown here).
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income measure on the individual level. Couples are especially likely to struggle to 
cover their housing costs if their residual income after paying for housing is low. If 
the partners have to negotiate even small expenditures, their psychological distress 
and fights about financial issues are likely to increase.
Our calculation of the residual income follows the suggestions made in Haffner 
and Heylen (2011). To determine the housing costs of owner occupiers, we used 
the information on monthly expenditures on utilities (heat, electricity, water) and 
on mortgages or building loans. To determine the housing costs of tenants, we used 
monthly expenditures, including rent and utilities. These items were part of the pair-
fam question program in Waves 1, 3 and 5 only. For Waves 2, 4 and 6, we used the 
values reported in the previous wave, but only if the respondent had not moved to 
a new place in the meantime. In Waves 3 and 5, the respondents were asked the 
question only if they had reported a residential move. This approach was based on 
the assumption that each couple’s housing costs changed relatively little in subse-
quent years unless they had moved to a new dwelling. The reported amount was then 
deducted from the monthly net household income.
The information on household income might be biased, as the respondents might, 
for example, have systematically reported having an income that was higher or a 
lower income than their actual income. The pairfam team checked for such measure-
ment errors by validating the incomes reported in pairfam with the incomes reported 
in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is regarded as a high-quality 
dataset. This validation showed that the results in the two datasets were almost iden-
tical (Arránz Becker et al. 2013). Based on the assumption that the income figures 
reported in the SOEP are correct, we can conclude that the income data reported in 
the pairfam are unbiased.
To account for the household structure, we divided the amount of income by the 
number of household members. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information 
about consumption patterns in couples. Inspired by the calculation of equivalized 
disposable household income, we included each child under age 12 as 0.5 of a per-
son (instead of as a full person) because children on average might consume less 
than adults. The affordability measure was broken down into three categories based 
on income terciles: a low-, a medium- and a high-residual-income group. Our meas-
ure of housing affordability was found to be closely related to household income: 
The absolute housing costs (including rent and utilities for renters and utilities and 
mortgages for owners) and the net household income in euros were found to be cor-
related with R = 0.33.5 Although this is a moderate statistical association, the value 
implies that housing costs and income are not completely collinear.
Our measure of housing affordability ignores that the residential choices depend 
not necessarily only on cost aspects but also on lifestyle preferences (Ærø 2006). 
Unfortunately, the pairfam data do not include information on housing preferences. 
There is also no explicit measurement of housing affordability at the regional level 
in the data. In order to test hypothesis H3b, we use the size of the settlement where a 
respondent lives at time of interview as a proxy measure for the affordability of the 
5 This correlation coefficient is calculated based on the complete case sample of our analyses.
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local housing market. In order to identify potentially nonlinear associations, we dis-
tinguish between small (< 20,000 inhabitants), medium (20,000 to 100,000 inhabit-
ants) and large settlements (> 100,000 inhabitants).
4.2  Other Covariates
In the multiple regression models, we controlled for the possible confounding effects 
of a number of factors. The descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in 
Table 1. The process time was the duration of the coresidential union at the time of 
the interview. We included in the model duration in months and duration in months 
squared. We also controlled for age of the female partner (because we did not expect 
any different effects for the male partner’s age, we chose not to add it to the models). 
Furthermore, we included the number of children in the household in our multiple 
regression analyses. The more children there were, the higher the household den-
sity was, and the lower the residual income was after housing costs were deducted. 
From a theoretical perspective, having children can be seen as investing in a part-
nership. Indeed, empirical research has shown that having children is a barrier to 
union dissolution. We can therefore assume that parenthood is a stabilizing factor in 
a relationship (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010; Wagner and Weiß 2003). In the sam-
ple, 26.5% of the couples had no children living in the household, 26.6% were living 
with one child, 33.3% were living with two children, and 13.7% were living with 
three or more children. Another control variable we included was marital status. It 
has been argued that married couples are more committed to their partnership than 
couples who share a household without being married (Stanley et al. 2004). In the 
data, the vast majority (72.5%) of the couples were married. (If a couple married in 
the course of the seven panel waves, the time-varying variable marital status was 
changed from unmarried to married.) We also accounted for regional differences 
using a binary variable denoting residence in either western or eastern Germany. It 
has been shown that in the decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, homeownership 
has been less common in eastern than in western Germany (Frick and Grimm 2010), 
and divorce rates have been lower in the east than in the west (Grünheid 2013). More 
than three-quarters (78.9%) of our respondents were living in western Germany.
In sensitivity analyses, we used two additional control variables: relationship 
satisfaction and net household income. We measured relationship satisfaction via 
the following question: Overall, how satisfied are you with your relationship? The 
response scale ranged from zero (very unsatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied), and the 
responses in our sample were strongly skewed, with a mean value of 7.9. The cat-
egorization of the satisfaction variable along the terciles thus led to a larger high 
satisfaction group (48.1%). Just 23.6% of the respondents were categorized as hav-
ing a medium level of satisfaction, and 28.3% were categorized as having a low level 
of satisfaction. Like the other variables, the satisfaction variable was measured in 
the wave before the separation information was reported. The net household income 
variable measured post-tax monthly income in 100-euro increments.6
6 When running regression models with other socioeconomic variables, such as partners’ education and 
labor force status, the effects of residual income turned insignificant; but the added variables themselves 
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5  Multiple Regression Results
The results of the discrete-time event-history analyses based on the multiply imputed 
data are shown in Table 2 and Figs. 1 and 2. In Table 3, we present the results of 
our sensitivity analyses. The results of the multiple regression analyses on the basis 
of the complete cases analyses (i.e., without imputation) are provided in Table  4 
in “Appendix”. The sizes of the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the complete 
cases analyses were largely in line with those based on the multiply imputed data, 
although the significance levels differed for a number of coefficients. The dependent 
variable is the transition to separation; in our case, the dissolution of coresidential 
partnerships. We present the average marginal effects, as they allow us to compare 
effect sizes across different models (Mood 2010). The average marginal effect in 
a logistic regression depends on the value of all of the explanatory variables; it is 
the mean of the marginal effects for each combination of covariates in the dataset 
and represents the average change in the probability of observing a specific outcome 
when we alter the respective independent variable from the reference to a different 
category based on our sample. In Table 5, we additionally present the results of the 
main analyses as odds ratios.  
5.1  Main Analyses
In our main analyses, we ran seven different models. In Models 1 to 4, we included 
each housing variable separately (including all control variables), while Model 5 is 
the full model. The interaction models (Models 6 and 7) are presented in Figs. 1 and 
2.
In line with the results of existing research and with hypothesis H1a, Model 1 
(Table 2) showed that tenants were significantly more likely to have dissolved their 
union (AME = 0.013, p  = 0.01) than couples who were living in joint homeowner-
ship (reference). We find mixed support for hypothesis H1b: On the one hand, being 
in the other category (e.g., non-tenants living in a dwelling owned by a partner’s 
parents) was positively related to union dissolution (AME = 0.024, p  = 0.01). On the 
other hand, couples who were living in a home owned by only one of the partners 
were not significantly more likely to separate than those who were living in a jointly 
owned home. This finding was robust even after the sole homeowner’s gender was 
taken into account. Model 2 shows the result for the operationalization including 
male and female sole homeowners as separate categories. Contrary to our expecta-
tions (hypothesis H1c), neither differed significantly from joint homeowners in their 
separation risks.7
Footnote 6 (continued)
did not show strong and significant effects. We interpret this result as an overspecification of the model. 
Given our focus on housing characteristics, and in order to keep the models parsimonious, we decided to 
exclude the employment and education characteristics of the two partners from the models.
7 Changing the reference category, the difference between male and female homeowners was also insig-
nificant (results not shown).
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Table 2  Discrete-time event-history models of union dissolution (average marginal effects). Source: Pair-
fam waves 1–7. Authors’ own calculation
# p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Multiply imputed data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Duration of coresidential union
 In years − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001* − 0.001
 In years squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000* 0.0001* 0.0001**
Age of female partner − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001** − 0.001*** − 0.001***
Children living in the household
 No children 0.008* 0.008* 0.010** 0.007*** 0.010**
 1 Child 0 0 0 0 0
 2 Children 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
 3 Or more children 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004
Partnership status
 Unmarried 0 0 0 0 0
 Married − 0.022** − 0.022** − 0.025** − 0.025*** − 0.022**
Region
 Western Germany 0 0 0 0 0
 Eastern Germany 0.006* 0.006* 0.006# 0.006** 0.005#
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 0 0
 Sole homeownership 0.004 0.004
 Tenants 0.013** 0.013**





 Male sole homeowner 0.005
 Female sole homeowner 0.002
 Tenants 0.013**




 Low residual income 0.000 − 0.001
 Medium residual income 0 0
 High residual income − 0.007* − 0.007*
Household density
 Low (< 1 persons/room) − 0.002 0.001
 Medium (1 person/room) 0 0
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Housing affordability (residual income)
Fig. 1  Interaction effect (Model 6). Average marginal effects of household density on union dissolution 
for different levels of housing affordability (residual income after housing costs are deducted). Refer-
ence category: medium-level density (dashed line). Source: Pairfam waves 1–7. Authors’ own calcula-
tion. Multiply imputed data. Control variables: duration of coresidential union, duration squared, age of 
female partner, partnership status, region, number of children in the household, housing tenure. Average 
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Housing affordability (residual income)
Fig. 2  Interaction effect (Model 7). Average marginal effects of settlement size on union dissolution for 
different incomes (residual income after housing costs are deducted). Reference category: large settle-
ment size (> 100,000 inhabitants, dashed line). Source: pairfam Waves 1–7. Authors’ own calculation. 
Multiply imputed data. Control variables: duration of coresidential union, duration squared, age of 
female partner, partnership status, region, number of children in the household, housing tenure, house-
hold density. Average marginal effects and significance levels are presented in Table 6 in “Appendix”
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Table 3  Sensitivity analyses. Discrete-time event-history models of union dissolution (average marginal 
effects). Source: Pairfam waves 1–7. Authors’ own calculation
# p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Multiply imputed data
Model 8










Duration of coresidential union
 In years 0.021** − 0.001 − 0.001
 In years squared − 0.004** 0.0001* 0.0001*
Age of female partner − 0.002** − 0.001** − 0.001**
Children living in the household
 No children 0.019** 0.014** 0.010**
 1 Child 0 0 0
 2 Children 0.016 0.003 0.004
 3 Or more children 0.021 0.004 0.003
Partnership status
 Unmarried 0 0 0
 Married − 0.030** − 0.017** − 0.022**
Region
 Western Germany 0 0 0






 Joint homeownership 0 0 0
 Sole homeownership 0.030# 0.002 0.004
 Tenants 0.038** 0.012** 0.013**




 Low residual income 0.014** − 0.001 − 0.001
 Medium residual income 0 0 0
 High residual income − 0.005 − 0.005# − 0.007*
Household density
 Low (< 1 persons/room) − 0.000 0.001 0.001
 Medium (1 person/room) 0 0 0
 High (> 1 person/room) 0.003 0.002 0.002
Net household income in 100 
euros
0.00003
Number of relationship-years 5091 15,934 16,036
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Model 3 presents the results for housing affordability. As hypothesized (H3a), the 
results indicated that the couples in the high-residual-income group (i.e., those who 
had the most income left over after housing costs were deducted) were significantly 
less likely to separate than those in the medium group. When the reference cate-
gory was changed to the high-residual-income group, it was revealed that this group 
also had a significantly lower risk of separation than the low-residual-income group 
(results not shown here).8
In Model 4, we included household density. We find no support for hypothesis 
H2a, as our results show that there was no significant difference in separation risks 
between couples in low-, medium- and high-density households.9 In the next step, 
we were interested in investigating whether the effect of density varied among 
couples with different levels of residual income (Fig. 1, Model 6) as suggested in 
hypothesis H2b.
The graph reveals that the interaction effect was insignificant for most categories: 
the predicted probability of union dissolution among couples living in a crowded 
household did not significantly differ by income group. (Only for the high-residual-
income group did density make a difference: those couples who did not have any 
affordability problems were significantly less likely to separate if they lived in high-
density households compared to those in medium-density households. It should, 
however, be noted that this group was small and therefore we refrain from making 
strong conclusions from this.) The results of Model 5 refer to the full model (with-
out gender of sole homeowners). The findings for housing tenure status and housing 
affordability remained unchanged compared to Models 1 and 3, respectively. The 
AME for density further shrank and remained insignificant in the full model. This 
result might reflect the fact that homeowners usually live in larger dwellings than 
tenants. But in additional analyses on tenants only, the AME for density also did not 
reach statistical significance (results not shown here). In sum, we do not find any 
evidence for an effect of household density on union dissolution, contrary to our 
hypotheses (H2a and H2b). This contradicts the results of a recent study in the UK 
that found a positive association between density-related stress and union dissolu-
tion (Coulter and Thomas 2019). In order to make sure that this difference was not 
only due to variable measurement, we also used alternative operationalizations of 
household density. In our analyses using the log of the persons per room ratio, the 
positive and significant AME disappeared after taking into consideration housing 
tenure in the full model (not shown here). Also, the results for alternative ordinal 
measurement of household density with two or four categories did not differ signifi-
cantly from those presented in Table 2.
9 In the baseline model (not shown here) with only the two relationship duration variables and density, 
we did find a significantly increased dissolution risk among couples who were living in a low-density 
household (i.e., a household in which the average number of persons per rooms was smaller than one) 
compared to couples in dwellings with a medium level of density (reference category). However, this 
effect turned insignificant after including the other control variables.
8 In order to determine whether the effect of housing affordability might differ according to housing ten-
ure status, we performed an additional analysis. However, we found no indication of an interaction of 
housing costs and housing tenure on the risk of separation (see Fig. 3 in “Appendix”).
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Figure 2 presents the results for the interaction between housing affordability and 
settlement size (Model 7). We expect that the housing market should be less tight 
in rural than in urban areas, and that it should therefore be easier to find alterna-
tive living arrangements for each partner after a separation in rural areas. This effect 
should be strongest for those in the low-residual-income group. In Fig. 2, the refer-
ence category is large settlement size (> 100,000 inhabitants). The graph shows that 
in our data, there was no significant difference in the risk of union dissolution by 
settlement size, including for those in the low-income group. Thus, based on this 
(admittedly very rough) measure of the availability of affordable housing, we found 
no support for hypothesis H3b.
The results for the control variables were largely in line with our expectations 
and were robust across the models. The AMEs of the duration of the coresidential 
partnership were significant in most of the models. The findings further indicated 
that childlessness was positively associated with the risk of union dissolution, while 
being married had a negative AME. The number of children was found to be less 
relevant, as the estimates for having more than one child were insignificant. The 
positive and significant AMEs for region (eastern/western Germany) found in most 
of the models indicate that the stability levels of coresidential unions were lower in 
eastern than in western Germany.
5.2  Sensitivity Analyses
In order to test whether our results are robust across different model specifications 
and samples, we performed some sensitivity analyses (Table 3). First, our sample 
is left-censored because coresidential couples that have separated before the onset 
of the pairfam study are not included. Therefore, there might be a positive selec-
tion of stable couples. In order to test for potential bias, we restricted the sample to 
couples who were living in a coresidential union for less than 6 years (5091 person-
years, i.e., 31% of the original sample) excluding the overrepresented couples with 
long union durations. The results in Model 8 show that among couples with shorter 
relationships, sole homeownership was significantly associated with higher separa-
tion risks compared to joint homeowners, which was not the case in the full sam-
ple. However in the sample of couples with shorter relationship durations, the group 
of joint homeowners is considerably smaller than in the full sample (9.1% in the 
short-duration sample compared to 26.6% in the full sample). Couples who decide 
to jointly own property after living together for less than 6 years might be a selective 
group with very high relationship satisfaction—and thus lower separation risks.
In the second sensitivity check, we performed additional analyses that included 
partnership satisfaction as a control. In line with our argument in the theoretical 
section of this paper, we expected that partnership quality would be an important 
mediator in the effect of housing quality on separation risk. We excluded partnership 
satisfaction from our main analyses in order to avoid overcontrol bias, and because 
we are interested in the total effect. It should be noted, however, that partnership sat-
isfaction can also be a confounder, because it is negatively related to the risk of sep-
aration, as well as to housing outcomes. For instance, the literature has shown that 
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couples who report having high levels of relationship satisfaction are more likely to 
become homeowners (Brüderl and Kalter 2001). Conversely, it seems plausible that 
couples who report having low levels of partnership satisfaction are less likely to 
invest in an extensive search for better housing because they anticipate splitting up. 
In Model 9, we tested the alternative model specification including relationship sat-
isfaction as a control variable. In line with theoretical expectations, the results show 
that respondents who were less satisfied with their partnership had higher separation 
risks, while those who were very satisfied with their partnership had lower dissolu-
tion risks. The AMEs of housing tenure and affordability shrink in size, which indi-
cates that these effects are partly mediated by relationship satisfaction.
In our third sensitivity analysis, we test whether the housing variables were asso-
ciated with the risk of union dissolution apart from the couples’ overall income situ-
ations. Model 10 includes the net household income in 100-euro increments as a 
control variable in order to account for the general socioeconomic situation of a cou-
ple. The effect of household income was insignificant in the model with the other 
control variables, while the AME of having a high residual income was significant 
in this specification as well. In other words, even after controlling for household 
income, housing affordability was statistically associated with the risk of separation.
6  Discussion
Because housing markets in many western countries have undergone substantial changes 
in recent years (for example, house prices have generally increased following the 2007 
financial crisis), it is important to improve our understanding of the effects of housing on 
partnerships. In this study, we investigated the relationship between couples’ housing con-
ditions and their likelihood of union dissolution. Prior research on the association between 
couples’ socioeconomic characteristics and their risk of separation generated mixed find-
ings. We argued that housing is a neglected component of a couple’s living standard that 
is related to the couple’s well-being and relationship stability. We focused on three aspects 
of housing: housing tenure, housing affordability and household density. Overall, our find-
ings imply that housing affordability and housing tenure status are important factors in 
relationship outcomes and should therefore be taken into consideration in future studies. 
We did not, however, find a significant association between household density and union 
dissolution.
The results of this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First, the find-
ing that couples with higher residual income had a lower risk of union dissolution is 
in line with the few studies on this topic (Lauster 2008; Coulter and Thomas 2019). 
This implies that housing costs might lead to tensions and conflicts between partners 
and thus increases the risk of separation. To ensure that we have not confounded the 
effects of housing affordability and socioeconomic status, we performed a simple 
sensitivity analysis with absolute household income as a control variable. The effect 
of housing affordability remained stable in this additional analysis, which implies 
that housing costs have an independent effect on partnership stability regardless of 
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overall income. These complex associations should be further analyzed in future 
studies to determine whether similar effects are found in other settings.
Second, in line with previous results and our own hypothesis (H1a), we found 
that homeowners had lower dissolution risks than tenants. In addition to examining 
the usual homeowner–tenant dichotomy, we were able to differentiate between joint 
homeowners and sole homeowners (i.e., couples in which only one partner owns the 
dwelling). The separation risks of the group of sole homeowners were not found to 
differ significantly from those of the group of joint homeowners. This is an interest-
ing finding. We expected to find that only joint homeownership was indicative of a 
mutual investment in the relationship and was thus associated with union stability. A 
number of studies that investigated this topic used an indicator that controlled only 
for joint homeownership versus all other housing tenure types. However, our results 
for sole homeowners suggest that they do not differ significantly from joint home-
owners. Thus, in future studies, sole homeowners should not be lumped together in 
a single group with non-owners. Yet the interpretation of this finding is not straight-
forward. On the one hand, if one partner in a couple was a homeowner before the 
relationship started, having the other partner move in might signal a strong com-
mitment to the relationship. On the other hand, it is possible that only one partner is 
registered as the homeowner for practical reasons, but both partners have invested in 
the home. The pattern for sole homeownership was the same for men and women, 
i.e., our hypothesis H1c, that sole homeownership informs us about the gendered 
independence structure within a couple, was not supported in our data.
Moreover, the dissolution risks of couples who were living in the property of a third 
party were found to be even higher than those of tenants. This finding might reflect the 
likelihood that moving into a home owned by one of the partner’s parents represents a 
transitory housing situation. It should be noted, however, that the share of couples who 
were in the other non-tenant group was small (5% in our sample). Additional research 
is needed to further investigate the underlying mechanisms of these different ownership 
types and their relationship to union stability.
Third, we did not find an association between household density and union dissolution. 
We expected to find that reduced private space was negatively associated with a person’s 
emotional well-being and was thus related to decreased relationship stability (H2a), but 
this idea was not supported in the analyses. Our findings are in line with existing evidence 
in Finland (Jalovaara 2002) and Luxembourg (van Damme 2019). However, other studies 
do find a positive association between room stress and separation (Coulter and Thomas 
2019 in the UK; Gerber and Zavisca 2015 in Russia). Future research should seek to rep-
licate our results by investigating the union dissolution patterns of couples in crowded 
households in other countries. This would help to identify settings in which household 
density is associated with union dissolution. Moreover, in other country contexts, it might 
be possible to analyze separately the effects of sharing a household with people other than 
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the couple’s own children; in the German setting, the share of households in this category 
is very small.
At first glance, the AMEs resulting from our models seem to be small in size. For 
example in Model 5, the average predicted probability of experiencing a union dissolution 
since the last wave among the couples in the high-residual-income group was 0.7 percent-
age points lower than that of the couples in the medium-residual-income group. However, 
within a single year, a separation is a rare event. In the 7-year period under study, only 
11.6% of the partnerships in our sample broke up, which indicates that the probability of 
experiencing the separation of a coresidential union is generally low. A comparison with 
the AME of being married might help to put our results into perspective: the predicted 
probability of separation for unmarried couples was, on average, 2.2 percentage points 
lower than that of married couples (Model 5). This means that the AME for the high-
residual-income group was about one-third the size of the AME for the married group. 
Given the relevance of marriage for couple stability, this finding indicates that the associa-
tion between housing affordability and the risk of union dissolution was non-negligible. 
In sum, and in line with the results of prior research, we found that demographic charac-
teristics seem to explain the largest share of the probability of union dissolution among 
the explanatory variables included in the regression models.
Most of the results we have presented here refer to the average couple; i.e., we did 
not delve into important differences that might exist across partnerships and within 
couples. Existing research has, for instance, shown that partners do not necessar-
ily agree on the intention to move (Coulter et  al. 2012); and it is also likely that 
partners sometimes differ in their evaluations of housing conditions. Moreover, the 
process of union dissolution is complex and may follow heterogeneous patterns. 
It could be argued that in addition to looking at the impact of housing affordabil-
ity on the risk of separation, researchers should account more explicitly for couple 
dynamics and family stratification. Some of these dynamics may include the relative 
income distribution within each couple and partners’ perceptions of the fairness of 
their respective contributions to household expenses—aspects that might affect both 
housing decisions and separation. However, such information was available for only 
a subsample of couples in pairfam  and therefore, we did not consider this in our 
analyses.10 Moreover, future studies should further investigate the role of the avail-
ability of alternative dwellings. It is possible that individuals in the low-residual-
income group in particular would have difficulties finding affordable housing after 
a union dissolution, and that such concerns might discourage them from separating. 
In our analyses, we could not find such an effect. However, we used settlement size 
as a proxy for the availability of affordable housing after separation. Future research 
should include more explicit measures to account for access to alternative housing.
A number of other aspects of the association between housing characteristics and 
the risk of separation could not be addressed in this study. Although we were focusing 
10 Controlling for age and education homogamy did not change our results substantially.
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on objective housing indicators in our study, it seems plausible that the effect of hous-
ing varies; indeed, it has been shown that the perception of crowding differs across cul-
tural settings (Kaya and Weber 2003; Palisi 1984) and across socioeconomic groups 
(Hu and Coulter 2017). Therefore, future studies should include subjective measures 
of crowding and housing cost burdens. Such subjective measures would also allow us 
to distinguish between those couples who prefer living in a dense home over living in 
a spacious place, or those who are willing to pay higher housing costs due to a prefer-
ence for higher-amenity homes compared to those who prefer spending less on hous-
ing but more on other goods and services. In addition, the use of more precise indica-
tors of housing quality or satisfaction with the housing situation and the neighborhood 
could provide us with important insights into the association between housing and the 
risk of union dissolution. From a theoretical point of view, we might expect to find that 
household density and housing affordability are related to psychological distress and 
thus increase the risk of union dissolution. In order to test whether the proposed mech-
anisms exist, it would be interesting to explicitly investigate the association between 
housing and stress. Unfortunately, the data collected in pairfam did not allow us to 
account for such factors.
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Appendix
See Tables 4, 5, 6 and Fig. 3.
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Table 4  Discrete-time event-history models of union dissolution  (average marginal effects).  Complete 
cases. Source: Pairfam waves 1–7. Authors’ own calculation
Complete cases analyses (without multiple imputation)
# p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5
Duration of coresidential union
 In years − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000
 In years squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age of female partner − 0.002** − 0.002** − 0.002** − 0.002** − 0.001**
Children living in the household
 No children 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.005
 1 Child 0 0 0 0 0
 2 Children 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002
 3 Or more children 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002
Partnership status
 Unmarried 0 0 0 0 0
 Married − 0.026** − 0.026** − 0.029** − 0.029** − 0.026**
Region
 Western Germany 0 0 0 0 0
 Eastern Germany 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 0 0
 Sole homeownership 0.006 0.007
 Tenants 0.015** 0.014**
 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 0.020** 0.020**
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 0
 Male sole homeowner 0.010*
 Female sole homeowner 0.000
 Tenants 0.015**
 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 0.020**
Housing affordability
 Low residual income 0.002 0.001
 Medium residual income 0 0
 High residual income − 0.006# − 0.006#
Household density
 Low (< 1 persons/room) − 0.005 − 0.001
 Medium (1 person/room) 0 0













 S. Krapf, M. Wagner 
1 3
Table 5  Discrete-time event-history models of union dissolution  (odds ratios). Source: pairfam waves 
1–7. Authors’ own calculation
Multiply imputed data
# p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Multiply imputed data
Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 Model B5
Duration of coresidential union
 In years 0.966 0.966 0.958 0.959 0.968
 In years squared 1.003* 1.003* 1.003* 1.003** 1.003*
Age of female partner 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.947*** 0.943*** 0.954***
Children living in the household
 No children 1.381* 1.381* 1.494** 1.367* 1.516**
 1 Child 1 1 1 1 1
 2 Children 1.236 1.235 1.161 1.188 1.215
 3 Or more children 1.249 1.248 1.146 1.167 1.187
Partnership status
 Unmarried 1 1 1 1 1
 Married 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.401*** 0.400*** 0.433***
Region
 Western Germany 1 1 1 1 1
 Eastern Germany 1.257* 1.259* 1.243# 1.277* 1.223#
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 1 1
 Sole homeownership 1.257 1.249
 Tenants 1.899*** 1.869***
 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 2.594*** 2.589***
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 1
 Male sole homeowner 1.320
 Female sole homeowner 1.148
 Tenants 1.902***
 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 2.599***
Housing affordability
 Low residual income 1.001 0.959
 Medium residual income 1 1
 High residual income 0.747* 0.750*
Household density
 Low (< 1 persons/room) 0.918 1.043
 Medium (1 person/room) 1 1
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Table 6  Interaction effects (models 6, 7 and 11). Discrete-time event-history models of union dissolution 
(average marginal effects). Source: Pairfam waves 1–7. Authors’ own calculation. Multiply imputed data. 
Control variables: duration of coresidential union, duration squared, age of female partner, partnership 
status, region, number of children in the household. In Model 6: also housing tenure. In Model 7: Also 
housing tenure and household density. In Model 11: also household density
# p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001




 Low (< 1 persons/room) − 0.001 − 0.003 0.002
 Medium (1 person/room) 0 0 0
 High (> 1 person/room) 0.011 − 0.012 − 0.015*
Model 7
Settlement size
 > 100,000 inhabitants 0 0 0
 20,000–100,000 inhabitants − 0.006 0.003 0.004
 < 20.000 inhabitants − 0.004 0.003 0.003
Model 11
Housing tenure
 Joint homeownership 0 0 0
 Sole homeownership − 0.010 0.009 0.007
 Tenants 0.011# 0.012* 0.015**
 Other (e.g., living in parents’ property) 0.014 0.027* 0.025**
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